Update: Autodesk Still Owns Your Software

On October 3, 2011 the U.S. Supreme Court declined a request to grant certiorari in Vernor v. Autodesk. As we reported previously, enterprising vendor Timothy Vernor, who attempted to sell second-hand (but unopened and authentic) copies of Autodesk’s AutoCAD software on eBay, was rebuffed by the Ninth Circuit, which determined that Autodesk’s customers were licensees and not owners. Thus the sale of the AutoCAD software to Vernor -- which was prohibited by the AutoCAD license -- was invalid, and Vernor himself, neither a licensee nor an owner, could not avail himself of the first sale doctrine.

The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari means that the Ninth Circuit’s three-prong test for determining whether a software user is a licensee or an owner is the law -- in the Ninth Circuit, that is. Will courts in other circuits follow suit? Or will subsequent software cases eventually yield a split, forcing the U.S. Supreme Court to weigh in?

In the meantime, the case is back in the hands of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, where it will adjudicate Vernor’s original claim for declaratory relief.

Ninth Circuit Imposes DMCA Liability, Even in the Absence of Copyright Infringement

The Ninth Circuit's liability determination in MDY Industries v. Blizzard, discussed in my prior post, rested not on copyright infringement, but on a violation of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) provisions regarding circumvention of access controls.

As discussed previously, Section 1201(a)(1) prohibits “circumvent[ing] a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under” Title 17. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). Both the Fourth Circuit, in MGE UPS Systems, Inc. v. GE Consumer and Industrial, Inc. et al., and the Federal Circuit, in Chamberlin Group Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., have held that the "DMCA prohibits only forms of access that would violate or impinge on the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners.” MGE UPS Systems, Inc. v. GE Consumer and Industrial, Inc. et al., No. 08-10521, 2010 WL 2820006 (5th Cir. July 20, 2010). In other words, circumvention that does not infringe or facilitate the infringement of a copyright is not actionable under Section 1201(a).

The Ninth Circuit took another approach. Looking to both the text of the relevant provisions as well as the legislative history of the DMCA, the court explained that there was no textual support for the requirement of an "infringement nexus" under Section 1201(a), which addresses circumventing controls over access only. In contrast, Section 1201(b) of the DMCA addresses circumvention of protection over copyright. The court, applying this logic, upheld the lower court's DMCA verdict.

The MDY Industries decision and resulting circuit split could have significant implications. Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, owners of copyrights in digital works -- software, video games, movies, and pretty much everything else these days -- can much more easily challenge uses of their products that are deemed harmful for various reasons, but which might not otherwise be infringing uses. On the flip side, the decision could potentially chill uses of copyrighted works that are typically considered "fair" because such uses happen to require circumvention of access controls in the first instance. It will be interesting to see whether MDY petitions the Supreme Court to consider the matter. For now, copyright owners filing in Ninth Circuit courts can consider getting a little more aggressive with regard to DMCA access violations, while users circumventing access controls may wish to tread a bit more lightly.

Update: Blizzard Owns Your Software

As expected, the Ninth Circuit has declared link that Blizzard's World of Warcraft (WoW) software licensees are just that -- licensees, and not owners -- because the WoW Terms of Use sufficiently restrict the transfer and use of the WoW software. MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment et al., No. 09-15932 (9th Cir. December 14, 2010). This outcome was predictable, and consistent with the court's decision in Vernor v. Autodesk, which outlined a three-part test for determining the owner/licensee status of a software user.

In Vernor, the court determined that Vernor's sale of used copies of AutoCad was outside the scope of the AutoCad license agreement. Further, because it was Autodesk's exclusive right to copy and distribute the AutoCad software, Vernor's sale thereof constituted copyright infringement. The outcome was different in MDY Industries, however, and liability rested on a DMCA violation even though no copyrights were infringed. As explained previously, MDY created a software "bot" that enabled WoW users to play the game on "autopilot." The court explained that, although the use of "bots" was prohibited by the WoW Terms of Use, it did not follow that operating outside of the scope of the license resulted in copyright infringement. For this to happen, the licensee's action must (1) exceed the license's scope, and (2) implicate one of the licensor's exclusive statutory rights. In this case, the anti-bot provisions of the Terms of Use did not implicate copyright law. So, although "a Glider user violates the covenants with Blizzard," it "does not thereby commit copyright infringement because Glider does not infringe any of Blizzard's exclusive rights [such as alter or copy World of Warcraft software]." The court explained further:

Were we to hold otherwise, Blizzard — or any software copyright holder — could designate any disfavored conduct during software use as copyright infringement, by purporting to condition the license on the player’s abstention from the disfavored conduct. The rationale would be that because the conduct occurs while the player’s computer is copying the software code into RAM in order for it to run, the violation is copyright infringement. This would allow software copyright owners far greater rights than Congress has generally conferred on copyright owners.

The MDY Industries decision is more notable, perhaps, for its treatment of the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digitial Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), discussed in my subsequent post.

Update: Autodesk Owns Your Software

Autodesk owns your software if you (think you) own a copy of AutoCAD, that is. In a reversal of fortune for enterprising eBay seller Timothy Vernor, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated summary judgment of noninfringement, holding that Autodesk's customers were licensees -- not owners -- and thus were not entitled to resell their copies under the first sale doctrine.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., No. 09-35969 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2010) (PDF)  Previously discussed here, Vernor, the purchaser of four authentic, used copies of AutoCAD, attempted to sell these copies on eBay. Autodesk objected, claiming that the terms of the software licensee to the original owner prohibit resale of the software, and eventually Vernor filed for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that his sales were lawful under the first sale doctrine, 17 U.S.C. Sec. 109. On summary judgment, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington held that the first sale doctrine applied, and that subsequent sales did not contitute copyright violations. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., No. C07-1189RAJ (W.D. Wash September 30, 2009) (PDF).

In vacating the lower court's decision, the Ninth Circuit set forth a three-part test for determining whether a software user is a licensee and not an owner, paraphrased as follows:

1. Does the copyright owner specify that the user is granted a license?

2. Does the copyright owner "significantly restrict" the user's ability to transfer the software?

3. Does the copyright owner impose "notable use restrictions"?

Applying this test to the facts, the Ninth Circuit determined that Autodesk's customers were licensees, and not owners. Accordingly, the sale of the software to Vernor by the original licensee -- which was prohibited by the AutoCAD license -- was not valid. Thus, Vernor and Vernor's customers were not owners of their copies of AutoCAD. The court remanded the matter for further proceedings.

This decision suggests significant changes for the current copyright regime, both for copyright owners and their customers. Will software publishers, emboldened by the validation of the AutoCAD license, attempt to exert greater control over physical copies of software, which could spell trouble for the large used software industry? Will "shrink-wrap" licenses spill over into other industries that use physical copies of copyrighted works (e.g., booksellers)? Or will the first sale question soon be a moot point, given our increasing reliance on digital delivery of copyrighted works, where licenses are the norm and copies are "tied" to individual accounts or computers? The court, acknowledging the various policy concerns, explained that "Congress is free, of course, to modify the first sale doctrine...if it deems these [policy considerations] to require a different approach." In the meantime, with the Augusto and MDY opinions pending, the Ninth Circuit has yet to have the last word on the first sale doctrine -- however, we now have a bit of guidance suggesting how those cases will be decided.  

One thing for certain is that many customers -- especially those who are less familiar with the nuances of a licensor/licensee relationship, but are very familiar with the you-buy-it-and-you-own-it rules of traditional purchasing -- simply won't know what they're buying when it comes to software, and that old maxim that so commonly pops up in daily life is especially relevant here: Read the fine print.  If you don't, you might end up like Vernor -- on the wrong end of a copyright suit.

Get Out of Jail(breaking) Free -- At Least As Far As Copyright Is Concerned

 In the past few years, the Apple iPhone and its "smartphone" brethren have seen widespread adoption throughout the United States. Combining the features of computers and traditional mobile phones, along with additional features like movement detection, GPS capabilities, and over-the-air videoconferencing, smartphones have, for many people, become indispensible tools for both work and pleasure.

Sometimes, however, users find the native functionality of certain smartphones to be limited. Some smartphones incorporate operating systems that restrict or eliminate features otherwise built in to the hardware, provide limited software functionality, or restrict the ability of the end user to use the phone in connection with "unauthorized" programs or media. For instance, among other things, the iPhone is "locked" and will only work with AT&T's wireless network, its operating system requires that "apps" -- which are approved by Apple beforehand -- be downloaded only from the Apple iTunes App Store, and its interface has very limited customizability features. So, while users enjoy the advanced hardware of smartphones, they often find the installed software to be stifling.

Many smartphone users with this problem turn to "jailbreaking" -- removing the software restrictions of the operating software. To jailbreak the iPhone, for instance -- that is, to relieve it of its Apple-imposed limitations -- requires the user to download and run a program or a series of programs that install custom software, and which modify the existing operating software. A jailbroken iPhone can then access unofficial "app stores" such as Cydia and Installer to download non-Apple-sanctioned third-party software and enable previously locked features and functionality.

Because jailbreaking requires users to "hack" their phones, there is a legitimate copyright concern. This is because the Digital Millennium Copy Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. sec. 1201 et seq. (PDF), which was designed to address copyright issues in the digital age, prohibits the act of circumventing measures that control access to copyrighted works -- in other words, hacking. Because jailbreaking a smartphone requires users to hack the phone to remove certain software protections, it was likely that -- absent other considerations such as fair use exceptions -- such an action violated the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions.

The questionable legality of jailbreaking prompted the Electronic Frontier Foundation to seek clarification from the U.S. Copyright Office as part of the Copyright Office's "Triennial Rulemaking" under the DMCA, which requires that every three years the Copyright Office conduct a process for designating exemptions -- that is, certain classes of works that for one reason or another may be "hacked" legally for certain purposes. See 17 U.S.C. Sec. 1201(a)(1)(C) and (D) (PDF).   As part of the rulemaking process, the U.S. Copyright Office questioned Apple on various issues related to jailbreaking. In its response to these questions (PDF), Apple maintained that, among other things, jailbreaking constitutes copyright infringement and the creation of infringing derivative works, violates the software license agreement covering the iPhone software, and diminishes the integrity and security of the iPhone software and the data network infrastructure generally.

In its ruling announced on July 26, 2010 and effective July 27, 2010 (PDF), the Copyright Office adopted six exemptions to the DMCA anticircumvention prohibitions, including:

Computer programs that enable wireless telephone handsets to execute software applications, where circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of enabling interoperability of such applications, when they have been lawfully obtained, with computer programs on the telephone handset.

Analogizing jailbreaking to the existing DMCA statutory exemption for reverse engineering for the purpose of making computer programs interoperable, see 17 U.S.C. sec. 1201(f), the Copyright Office explained that:

On balance, the Register concludes that when one jailbreaks a smartphone in
order to make the operating system on that phone interoperable with an independently created application that has not been approved by the maker of the smartphone or the maker of its operating system, the modifications that are made purely for the purpose of such interoperability are fair uses.

And so the jailbreaking exemption was adopted. A separate exemption was adopted for "unlocking" the phone to work with any compatible voice and data carrier.

Of course, as Apple correctly points out, copyright is hardly the only relevant legal issue -- among other things, jailbreaking an iPhone might violate Apple's iPhone license agreement and render void the iPhone warranty. However, because it is a reasonably simple process to reload a clean version of the iPhone operating system -- with nary a trace of the jailbreak -- this is probably not a significant deterrent for would-be escapees. Further, as discussed in my post regarding the first-sale doctrine and enforceability of end-user license agreements, perhaps challenges could be raised to Apple's insistence that its customers are not owners of the operating software, but only licensees (indeed, in its ruling, the Copyright Office noted that it "cannot clearly determine whether the various versions of the iPhone contracts with consumers constituted a sale or license").

Is this the end of the jailbreaking copyright inquiry? Might Apple or other smartphone manufacturers challenge the Copyright Office's exemption determination, or will they more aggressively lock down software to deter potential jailbreakers? We will probably not have to wait too long to find out.

So You Think You Own That Software?

 

Many of us have, at one point or another, found ourselves overwhelmed by the amount of stuff lying around our homes, and have taken the opportunity to clean up (and make a bit of spending money in the process) by selling used books, CDs, DVDs, or VHS tapes at a yard sale, or at a pawn shop, or on an Internet site like Ebay or Craigslist. Even though these items are typically subject to copyright protection, we are allowed to sell them -- or otherwise dispose of them as we see fit -- because of the "first sale doctrine," a limitation on copyright articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark decision of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), and subsequently codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. sec. 109. In short, the first sale doctrine allows a purchaser of a lawfully made copy of a work -- for instance, a book -- to sell that book without the permission of the copyright holder -- in other words, the copyright holder's rights to control that particular copy of the book end once that book is first sold. The first sale doctrine applies to all copyrighted works, though certain exclusions have been made for rental, lease and lending of computer software and phonorecords, which require authorization of the copyright owner.

Because the first-sale doctrine essentially creates a secondary market for copyrighted works (arguably resulting in fewer profits for some copyright owners), and because digital works are easily copied and manipulated, certain software and music publishers have attempted to sidestep the doctrine by attempting to control, via contract, the actions of purchasers. For instance, some copies of software contain so-called "shrink wrap" licenses, also called End-User License Agreements (EULAs), which purport to bind the purchaser upon opening the software package or installing the software. EULAs vary, but typically define the relationship between the end-user and the copyrighted work as a "license" arrangement -- that is, the user has not purchased a copy of the software, but only purchased the license to use the software under certain conditions defined by the copyright owner. Of course, many EULAs prohibit the transfer of that "license" to third parties, among other various restrictions.

Three cases pending before the Ninth Circuit promise to shed some light on the enforceability of EULAs and similar contracts purporting to restrict the actions of end-users. The first, Autodesk v. Vernor, stems from a lawsuit by Vernor, a reseller of used copies of Autodesk's Autocad software on Ebay, who sought declaratory relief based on Autodesk's prior interference with his Ebay auctions. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington held that the first sale doctrine trumped any contractual agreement to not resell the product, and that subsequent sales did not constitute copyright violations. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., No. C07-1189RAJ (W.D. Wash September 30, 2009) (PDF).

The second case, UMG v. Augusto, involves Ebay sales of promotional CDs of UMG musicians that were originally handed out to music reviewers and found by Augusto at record stores. The CDs were labeled "PROMOTIONAL USE ONLY -- NOT FOR SALE," which UMG claimed constituted "label licenses." The court below, noting that the "only benefit to a license for UMG is to restrain transfer of its music," held that the "label license" did not create an agreement between UMG and the original recipients of the CDs, and granted Augusto's summary judgment motion as to UMG's copyright claim, holding that Augusto's sales of promotional CDs did not constitute copyright infringement.  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Troy Augusto et al., No. CV-03106 SJO (AJWx) (C.D. Cal June 10, 2008) (PDF).

MDY v. Blizzard is a bit more complicated in that it doesn't deal with resale of copyrighted goods, but rather the end user's ability to interact with the software (and copy the software to a computer) in a manner ostensibly prohibited by the EULA. Blizzard is the creator of the well-known World of Warcraft computer program, a massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) in which players, via player-created avatars, make friends, battle enemies, gain "experience points," and earn in-game money to spend on equipment and items for their avatars. MDY created a software program called Glider that enables users to play World of Warcraft on "autopilot," meaning that players could be away from their computers while their avatars would continue to operate in-game. Because the terms of the World of Warcraft EULA prohibited "bots," as such programs are typically called, Blizzard claimed that MDY was tortiously interfering with the EULA between Blizzard and end users, and that MDY was vicariously liable and otherwise contributing to the copyright infringement (e.g., copying of the game program into computer system memory outside of the scope of the limited license). The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment for, among other claims, Blizzard's claims of vicarious and contributory copyright infringement.  See MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. et al., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz. January 28, 2009) (PDF).

All three cases have been appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

So, who really owns "your" software, and to what extent are you allowed to modify it for personal use? What about "your" music CD? The Ninth Circuit's treatment of these cases promises to provide some clarity on the enforceability of EULAs and shrink wrap licenses on original purchasers, as well as the effect of such contracts on downstream consumers. Both copyright owners and consumers should pay close attention.

Do you own that software?  You'll just have to wait to find out.